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Poverty and the Social Welfare System in Ireland: 
Policy Implications 
1. Introduction 
Social welfare payments account for about 28 per cent of 
Exchequer current expenditure. How effective is this 
expenditure? To answer this question we must first know what 
the social welfare system is trying to achieve. Since the 
system in fact has multiple objectives, assessing its 
effectiveness is by its nature a complex exercise. However, 
one major aim is clearly directing resources to those in 
need, the alleviation of poverty: in this paper we 
concentrate on an assessment of the social welfare system in 
terms of this objective. 
In doing so, we make use of the results of a major 
national household survey carried out by the ESRI. This 
allows us to first describe the backgro11nd against which the 
social welfare system operates, in terms of recent trends in 
poverty and the characteristics of low-income households. 
This draws on our recently published research based on the 
survey, and for. the present paper this is only briefly 
summarised to provide the context for the analysis of the 
social security system. 
We begin that analysis by examining the performance of 
the system in meeting its own minimum income objective, as 
defined by the safety net scheme <Supplementary Welfare 
Allowance>. We then consider some broader measures of the 
systo1n's effectiveness and efficiency in reducing poverty as 
Independently defined. The indirect costs associated with 
incentive effects of the social sec11rity system and its 
financing are then discussed. Finally we consider some 
current policy issues in the light of the foregoing analysis. 
The data used in this paper are taken from the results 
of the ESRI national Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty 
and Usage of State Services, carried out in 1987. The project 
has been co-sponsored by the Institute, the Combat Poverty 
Agency, and the EC Commission, and forms the Irish element of 
a study on poverty and social security being carried out in a 
number of the Community countries. Only the briefest of 
descriptions of this database is given here: further details 
on the sampling procedure, data gathered, response and 
post-sampling reweighting are given in Callan et al., 11988, 
Ch.2). Detailed information on income from all sources and on 
other objective and subjective indicators of poverty, as well 
as on assets, debts, education and labour force 
participation, usage of health and education services and a 
variety of other topics was gathered. Responses were received 
from .about 3,300 households, representing 64 per cent of 
effective sample comparable with the results of the 
national Household Budget· Surveys of 1973 and 1980. 
Information on the 8,200 adults in these households was 
obtained. 
Jn order to correct for bias in the responding 
households, the sample was reweighted to accord with known 
national totals <from the 19D6 Labour Force Survey> in terms 
of: 
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(al the number of adults in the household, 
(bi urban/rural location, 
(cl age of household head, 
(di social-economic group of househo'l.d head. 
When the reweighted sample was then compared with other 
independent national totals, for the distribution of 
households by n11mber of persons at work and number of persons 
unemployed, there was close correspondence between the two, 
reinforcing confidence in the representativeness of the 
sample. 
2. Measuring Poverty 
It is now widely accepted that poverty in developed 
countries cannot be conceived narrowly in terms of an 
"absolute'' minimum necessary for physical survival. There is 
a broad consensus that it must rather be measured in the 
context of the particular society being examined, and is in 
that sense relative. The most influential explicit ~tatement 
of this relative basis is that of Townsend: 
Individuals, families and groups in the population 
can be said to be in poverty when they lack the 
-resources to obtain the type of diet, participate 
in the activities and have the living conditions 
and amenities which are customary, or al least 
widely encouraged, or approved, in the societies to 
which they belong. Their resources are so 
seriously below those co1mnanded by the average 
individual or family that they are, in effect, 
excluded from ordinary living patterns, customs and 
activities <Townsend, 1979, p.311. 
Within this broad concept, though, there are many possible 
approaches to measuring the extent of poverty. <See Callan 
and Nolan, 1987, for a detailed discussion of absolute versus 
relative conceptions of povel'ty and for a survey of such 
approaches.I One widely used approach, applied in previous 
work on measuring poverty in Ireland by for example Roche 
119841, Fitzgerald (1981) and Rottman, Hannan, et al., 
11982), takes as starting point the rates of income support 
provided by the social welfare system. These al'e taken to 
represent an "official" poverty line, in some sense the 
product of a social consensus on the minimum necessary 
income. However this approach has major shortcomings, both 
conceptually and in implementation. Most obviously, raising 
social security payments can paractoxi.cal ly be reflected in a 
rise in measured poverty. More generally, changes in the 
extent· of poverty over time can be masked or exaggerated by 
changes in the generosity of social security. This is not to 
say, of course, that the number of persons falling below the 
safety-net income level provided by the social security 
system is unimportant. It is clearly a very important 
indicator of the performance of the system in meeting its own 
targets:· it cannot, though, provide an appropriate 
independent standard for assessing the extent of poverty or 
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changes in poverty over time. 
While a variety of methods for deriving a poverty line 
independent of the social security syste,n have been applied 
<elsewhere), no one method commands universal acceptance, and 
there is considerable scope for disagreement even in the 
application of particular approaches. If is not even clear 
that the view implicit in the search for "the" poverty line, 
namely that poverty is an ''all or nothing'' phenomenon, that 
''the poor are different'', reflects reality in most developed 
societies. We intend to address this issue and assess a 
number of approaches to deriving poverty cut-offs in later 
work. This will, for example, use the considerable range of 
data on patterns of living and deprivation and on 
respondents· views about necessities and minimum income needs 
gathered in the ESRI survey. 
However, given the considerable scope for legitimate 
disagreement about how a poverty line should be derived and 
whether a single line would adequately reflect the underlying 
reality, we have in this paper adopted an alternative 
approach. Rather than seeking to derive a particular poverty 
line and presenting results contingent on that line - which 
may then be considered of little relevance by those who 
favour a higher or lower line - we have applied a range of 
relative poverty lines. The major objective is then to see 
the extent to which conclusions can be drawn which are not 
sensitive to the particular line chosen. Clearly when this is 
possible the conclusions are considerably more valuable and 
firmly based than those contingent on a particular line - and 
it is encouraging that we have so far been able to identify 
some important results which are ''robust'' in this sense. 
The scope for disagreement about the location of the 
poverty line extends not just to the needs of a particular 
family or household type - for example a single adult living 
alone but also to the relationship between the needs of 
different family/household types. If, for example, a single 
adult ''needs'' £50 per weelt, how mucl1 does a couple witl1 two 
children need? Again we have taken the approach that, given 
the absence of a consensus on the appropriate adjustment, a 
variety of figures should be used and the sensitivity of the 
results examined. The conventional procedure for adjusting 
for differences in needs across l1ousohold types involves the 
use of ''equivalence scales'', which express different 
composition types in a conunon unit. Thus, if a single adult 
is taken to be one adult equivalent, a couple may be counted, 
for example, as 1.7 and a further 0,5 added for each child. 
(These particular values are used here for illustrative 
purposes, although they have also been applied in a 
cross-country poverty study for the EC Commission.I Dividing 
total household income by the number of adult equivalents 
then produces the income per equivalent adult, which can be 
compared across ho11seholds of all types. Using a range of 
equivalence scales, we thus explore the effect of varying the 
allowance made for the "needs" of extra adults and of 
children· .. 
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3. Poverty in the ESRI Sample 1987 
3.1: Aggregate Results Using Relative Poverty Lines 
For the reasons outlined, we apply a range of relative 
poverty lines and explore in particular the implications for 
trends in the extent of poverty and the characteristics of 
''the poor''. The relative poverty line approach not only has 
the appeal of simplicity, leading to easily interpreted 
results, it also has the considerable advantage of ready 
application to the cso Household Budget Survey CHBSJ data for 
19BO, so these trends can be examined. In calculating these 
lines, we adopt the following procedure. 
(ii The 
calculated 
disposable weekly income of each household is 
i.e., gross income less income tax and PRSI 
contributions; 
(iii the number of adult equivalent units on each household 
is calculated, for a particular set of equivalence scales 
C see below I; 
(iii) average income per equivalent adult fof each household 
is calculated; 
livl the mean adult equivalent income across households in 
the sample is derived; 
Cvl three poverty lines are defined as percentages of this 
mean - at 40 per cent, 50 per cent and GO per cent of mean 
disposable household equivalent income. 
In addition to using these three clifferent perce11tage 
cut-offs, a number of different equivalence scales were 
applied. We first present results on the basis of Cal the 
set of scales implicit in the current rates of. payment of 
social welfare, notably in the Supplementary Welfare 
Allowance/ Unemployment Assistance schemes <including Child 
Benefit I. These, broadly speaking, allow a married couple 
lGG per cent of the single adult's entitlement, and add a 
further 33 per cent for each child. We then discuss the 
difference made by using other scales which imply different 
relativities in needs. 
Mean household income in the sample was Cl98 per week. 
When mean equivalent income and the three poverty lines are 
calculated 11sing the. equivalence scales destribed, mean 
equivalent income is C85.45 per week, so the three poverty 
cut-offs are about C34, C43 and CSl respectively for a single 
adult. For a married couple with two children, the cut-offs 
are C79, C99 and £119 respectively. 
Concentrating first on the overall numbers falling below 
these lines, Table 3.1 shows the percentage of households and 
persons below each line for the ESRI sample and also for the 
1980 HBS sample. Clearly the percentage involved varies very 
substantially depending on the cut-off used with the 
percentage of households below the line in 1987 ranging from 
() 
7.5 per cent to 30 per cent. At each line, though, the 
percentage of persons falling below in 1987 is greater than 
the percentage of household - poor households are. larger than 
average. This was not the case in 1980 f0r two of the three 
lines. Looking at the overall trend between 1980 and 1987 we 
see that there was an increase in the percentage of both 
households and persons below the 50 per cent and 60 per cent 
line, but not the lowest, 40 per cent line. 
Table 3.1: Percentage of Households and Persons Below 
Relative Poverty Lines, 1980 and 1987 
Equivalence Scale l/0.66./0.33 
1980 HBS 1987 ESRI 
Per Cent (aJ Househol c/s 
40 Per Cent Line 8.0 7.5 
50 Per Cent Line 16.8 17.5 
60 Per Cent Line 27.6 30.0 
(b) Persons 
40 Per Cent Line 8.5 8.2 
50 Per Cent Line 16.2 19.8 
60 Per Cent Line 26.7 31.4 
To assess the sensitivity of these results to the 
eqnivalence scales used, we also appli.cd a number of other 
sets of scales, including (bi the scale incorporating 
additions of 70 per cent of the single adult's needs for each 
extra adult and 50 per cent for each child - nscd in the EC 
· study mentioned above; and (cl the scale incorporating 60 per 
cent for each extra adult and 40 per cent. for each child 
(frequently used in UK studies I. So both (bi and (cl allow 
more for the needs of children than the implicit social 
welfare scale we have used so far, while (bi allows more and 
(cl less for additional adults. 
Using these scales, a higher percentage of households 
and persons was found 11nder each lino than in Table 1, with 
the difference being more marlrncl for (bi than fOi' (c). At the 
highest 1 ines, for example, 33. 5 per cent of all persons 
were below the line using scale (bi compared with 30 per cent 
in Table 3.1. Using these scales there is a larger increase 
between 1930 and 1987 in the percentages falling below the 
50 per cent and 60 per cent lines, and an increase is now 
also seen at the 40 per cent line. On the basis of the 
scales used, then, we can conclude that the direction of the 
overall trend in the 1980s is only sensitive to the choice of 
scale at thr lower end of the range of poverty cut-offs. At 
the 50 per cent line, fur example, we find the percentage of 
persons in households below the llne incr0ases by 3-4 per 
cent between 1980 and 1987 irrespective of the scale used. 
Before briefly discussing important changes in the 
composition of poor househoicls over this period, a number of 
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other features of the overall results must be mentioned. 
First, it must be noted that mean household equivalent income 
actually fell by about 1.5 per cent in real terms between 
1980 and 1987. This means that the relative poverty lines 
applied to 1987 are also below the 1980 lines by that 
percentage: a lower real standard is being applied to the 
latter year. If instead we apply poverty cut-offs to 1987 
which represent the same real income as the 1980 relative 
lines, we thus find a greater percentage in poverty in 1987 
than shown in Table 3.1 - about 1 per cent greater for 
persons - and an unambiguous increase in poverty between 1980 
and 1987 at all poverty lines/equivalence scales 
combinations. 
Even in the context of purely relative poverty lines, 
assessing the extent of poverty purely in terms of the 
percentage falling below certain income levels may not convey 
the full picture. Focusing purely on this measure of poverty, 
we may for example rate a situation where 20 per cent of 
households are just below the poverty line as worse than one 
where 18 per cent are well below the 1 ine - the depth of 
poverty for those pelow the line is missed. We therefore also 
applied measures which take into account both the numbers 
falling below the poverty line and the extent of their income 
shortfall. These measures showed a consistent increase in 
poverty between 1980 and 1987 across all the relative poverty 
line/equivalence scale combinations. 
Finally, the recipient unit we have used so far has been 
the household. This may consist of a nuclear family of for 
example a single person or a couple with dependent children, 
but il may also comprise a couple with working children 
and/or elderly relatives. In the case of sucl1 "extended'' 
families, the appropriate unit of analysis for the assessment 
of the standard of living of the individuals involved is not 
obvious a priori, since it depends on tl1e extent to which 
income is actually shared between all the individuals. The 
tax and social welfare systems operate (for the most partl on 
the narrower recipient unit of single person/couple with 
dependent children, so that a l1ousehold may contain a number 
of tax or benefit units. In looking at the operation of the 
social welfare system we will therefore also want. to use the 
narrower unit, so it may be !1elpful al this stage to refer to 
the difference this makes to the overall extent of poverty. 
Applying relative poverty lines to 1987 using the narrower 
unit, we find in general a slightly higlier percentage of 
persons in tax units below the poverty lines than were in 
households below tl1e lines. 
3.2: The Characteristics of Low-Income f/ouseliolds 
Key questions for policy are who are the people in 
low-income households, what are the characteristics of these 
households, and how has tl1is been changing over time? Our 
objectiv~ again is to particularly pinpoint findings which 
hold consistently across poverty lines and equivalence 
scales. The resul ls which we summarise very briefly here are 
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fully set out in Callan et al., 
(1988). 
(1988) and Callan and Nolan 
Looking first at demographic characteristics, a number 
of results may be highlighted. First, households with 
children run a higher risk of being in poverty than those 
without children and children run a higher risk than adults -
that is, they are over-represented among the poor compared 
with in the population as a whole. This is more pronounced 
11sing the equivalence scales which incorporate the larger 
allowance for the needs of children compared with adults, as 
we would expect, but remains true even for the social welfare 
implicit scales. For example, using the latter scales and the 
50 per cent relative lino, 59 per cent of poor households 
contai11ed children compared with only 44 per cent of all 
households <defining children as aged under 14 to allow 
comparisons with the 1980 HBS>. At this 1 ine, 26 per cent of 
all children were in poverty, compared with 17 per cent of 
adults. 
Comparing 1987 with 1980, the risk for children and for 
households with children can be seen to have risen much more 
rapidly than for adults/households without children. While 
children were at higher risk of being in poverty than adults 
in 1980, lhe difference was not nearly as marked as in 1987. 
This high risk in 1987 can be seen to be concentrated largely 
among household with three or more children: those consisting 
of a co11ple with only one child actually have a relatively 
low risk, while couples with two children have a risl, nol 
very different from the overall average. (It should be noted 
though that the equivalence scales used he1·e do not allow for 
any economies of scale with respect to children>. Slnglo 
adults with children also have a relatively high rlsk, though 
accounti11g 011ly for a small proportion of the poor. 
Looking at the characteristics. of the l1ousehold head 
<HOH>, it is notable that where the HOH is elderly - 65 or 
over - the risk of being in poverty is well below average for 
all poverty lines. For example, at the 50 per cent line land 
again usinc; thH social welfare implicit equivalence scales), 
17. 5 per cent of al 1 households are in poverty, but only 
9.5 per cent of households headed by an elderly person arc 
below tl1is line. This reflects tl1e significar,t improvement in 
the relative position of the elcierly which has been tallinc; 
place since the 1970s. 
Turning to the labour force status of the household 
head, Table 3.2 shows the composition of households under 
each of the relative poverty lines in 1987 classified by this 
variable (still using the social welfare equivalence scales>. 
At each poverty line, J1ouseholds headed by an unemployed 
person or a farmer are the two largest categories, and 
combined they account for over half of all households below 
the 40 per cent and 50 per cent lines. Households headed by a 
retired or self-employed person are under-represented beneath 
each line. While employee-headed households make up only 
8 per cent of those under the 40 per cent and 50 per cent 
line, this rises rapidly to almost 13 per cent of those under 
the 60 per cent line. As far as farm households are 
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concerned, it should be noted that our estimates of farm 
income are based on data for the calendar year 1986, which 
was a particularly poor year, with a significant recovery in 
farm incomes since then. , 
Tab 1 e 3. 2: Sample Households and those Bel ow Rei a Ii ve Poverty Li 11es by 
labour Force Status of Head of Household, 1987 
Below Relative Poverty line'•' 
Labour Force Status 
Employee 
Self-employed 
(excluding farmer> 
Farmer 
Unemployed 
Sick but Intending 
to Seek Work 
Sick but Not Intending 
to Seek Work 
Returned 
Home Duties 
Total 
40 Per 
Cent 
8.1 
6.8 
37.8 
17.l 
4.8 
4.2 
9.4 
11. 3 
7.5 
(al Equivalence Scale 1/0.66/0.33. 
50 Per 60 Per 
Cent Ce_nt 
Per Cent 
8.5 12.8 
5.0 4.8 
24.6 18.2 
33.2 25.2 
3.5 2.6 
6.9 10.0 
9.3 10.3 
7.6 15.9 
17.5 30.0 
All Households 
in Sample 
37.9 
7.5 
12.4 
10.3 
l. 2 
4.8 
14. 4 
11. 3 
100.0 
Looking at the major changes in labour force status 
between 1980 and 1987, the most striking feature, as we would 
expect, is the increase in the importance of unemployment. for 
low-income households. The overall national unemployment rate 
rose from 8 per cent to over 18 per cent during this period. 
This was reflected in t.he fact that, using the 50 per cent 
line for example, only 15 per cent of poor households in 1980 
were headed by an unemployed person, compared with one-third 
of such l1ouseholds in 1987. Also, The declining importance 
of households headed. by a retired person is significant: 
whereas in 1980 19 per cent of the households under the 
50 per cent line had a retired HOH, by 1987 this had fallen 
to 9 per cent. 
Having outlined the background against which the social 
welfare system operates, we now turn to an analysis of the 
effectiveness and efficiency of that system in reducing 
poverty. 
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4. Evaluation of the Peformance of the Social Welfare system 
in Reducing Poverty 
The reduction or elimination of poverty would be widely 
regarded as the most important objective of the social 
security system. But it is also called.upon to play other 
major roles. The most important of these would be horizontal 
or vertical redistribution above the poverty line, and income 
replacement: the provision of pensions, for example, may not 
be wholly for reasons of poverty reduction. The Commission 
on Social Welfare has noted that ''the trend has been for less 
emphasis to be placed on the original, historical objective 
of poverty relief and increasing emphasis on income 
distribution and income replacement'', However, we are going 
to neglect these other objectives in the present analysis, 
and concentrate simply on the performance of the system in 
reducing poverty. This means that we are presenting a 
partial evaluation of the system; the trade-offs against 
other objectives would also have to be considered in 
evaluating policy options. We are working on a model which 
will allow simulation of the effects of policy changes on the 
represer1tative sample of households; tl1is will provide a more 
reliable guide to the relative merits of different policy 
options in terms of poverty reduction and these broader 
goals. The present analysis can help, however, to identify 
some of the problems and possible directions for policy 
changes. 
5. Effectiveness of the Social Welfare System in Providing a 
Safety Net 
5.1 Outline of the Safety Net 
We begin this analysis of the performance of the social 
welfare system with a simple mea~uro of the effectiveness of 
the system in providing a safety net income; this has been 
widely applied in the UK a11d other countries as a key 
indicator of the system's performance. 
The Supplementary Welfare Allowance was introduced with the 
provision of a safety net income as one of its main 
objectives; the level of income is the lowest provided by the 
system, equal to the Short-term Unemployment i\ssistance 
payment. This was [33 per week for a single person in the 
early part of the survey period, and [34 per week from July 
1987 onwards. Our analysis of the performance of tl1e systo1n 
in providing this safety net does not imply any judgemer1t 
concerning the adequacy of this payment; it simply takes the 
system on its own terms, and evaluates its performance in 
achieving one of its main objectives. 
5.2 Basic Results 
The details of the calculation are set out in our report to 
the Combat Poverty Agency (Callan et al., 1988>. Here we 
need only summarise the main features. The first point to 
note is that the calculations are based on a conservative 
estimate of what the safety ~et aims to provide; the baseline 
estimate takes no account of additional payments which 
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families on the Scheme often receive, for housing costs, 
dietary or special needs. The Supplementary Welfare 
Allowance scheme, like most elements of the tax/transfer 
system, works with a unit based on a single person or married 
couple, together with dependent children. The precise 
definition of a dependent child for the SWA scheme is simply 
one under the age of 18. Our analysis of the safety net is 
necessarily at this ''benefit unit'' level. We do, however, 
take account of the ''benefit and privilege'' assessment, which 
implies a one-sided income sharing arrangement from parents 
to older, financially dependent children such as those 
unemployed or in full-time education. 
The results show that one person in ten falls below thts 
safety-net income level. Comparison with results from the UK 
on the numbers falling below the Supplementary Benefit 
standard suggests that the Irish system has a safety net with 
rather more gaps; the UK figures tend to cluster around the 5 
per cent mark. 
5.3 Nature of the Gaps in the Safety Net 
The obvious next question is, how can so many people be 
falling below the safety net income? There are two broad 
reasons. First, some persons are not eligible for the 
safety-net income; and second, some of those who are eligible 
for income support are not receiving it. It might be thought 
that pe1·sons waiting for the processing of a claim might also 
feature; but tl1is group was found to be very small. 
The specific exclusions on the Supplementary Welfare 
Allowance are that it is not payable to persons in full-time 
employment, or in full-time education. Tl1e latter exclusion 
is not an important fa.ctor from our point of view: we still 
· find one person in 10 below the SWA income level, even if 
benefit units comprising persons in full-time education are 
excluded. 
The implications of the exclusion of persons in full-time 
employment need careful interpretation. rull-time employees 
with children, who are on incomes below the SWA standard 
would be eligible for income support through the Family 
Income Supplement scheme. Farmers would also be eligible for 
Unemployment Assistance, subject to a means test. Roughly 
speaking, it is only full-time employees without children, 
large farmers, and the self-employed who would effectively be 
ineligible for any income support. 
We have classified those falling below the SWA income 
standard in a way which helps to identify their eligibility 
or otherwise for income support. Whether or not a farmer 
would be eligible for income supporl depends partly on a 
longer term measure of i11come from the farm than our 1986 
calendar year estimate. The group of persons ineligible for 
income support, who fall below the SWA income standard, is a 
significant one, but not a major part of the total. Depending 
on the e1igibility status of farmers, between 40 per cent and 
70 per cent of those falling below the SWA income standard 
are apparently entitled to income support, but are not 
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receiving it. This is not just a question of small amounts 
going unclaimed; the average entitlement is quite sizable 
<t:20 to t:30). A conservative estimate of the· amount of 
benefit not taken up by those entitled to Supplementary 
Welfare Allowance or Unemployment Assistance payments 
suggests a lower bound of around t:50m annually, or 10 per 
cent of the total potential expenditure. 
5.4 Non-take-up of means-tested benefits 
The phenomenon of persons entitled to income support, but not 
actually receiving it, goes under the broad heading of 
"non-take-up''. There are many possible causes of this 
sizable non-take-up found in the ESRI survey, and their 
implications differ markedly. 
The simplest cause is that potential claimants are not aware 
of their entitlements. For instance, young unemployed adults 
may believe that they have no entitlement because they are 
living with their parents; the rules of the system mean that 
they could be entitled to the full payment, if the parental 
income was a low one. This problem could be a serious one 
for the persons involved, but would have no implications 
outside this group. 
There are other reasons for non-take-up which have important 
implications not only for the non-take-up group itself, but 
also for persons who do actually -receive the benefits. 
Non-take-up may be caused by the fact that for some people 
the value of the benefit entitlement ls outweighed by the 
costs of claiming the benefit. These costs would include the 
items such as time, travel and any stigma felt to be attached 
to the payment or associated means test. Atkinson (1984) 
empl1asises that such costs may reduce the true value of the 
financial assistance given, even where the benefit is 
·received. 
In ou1· report to the Combat Poverty Agency, (Callan et al., 
19881 we examined the take-up of Family Income Supplement in 
greater detail. This scheme is an extreme example in two 
senses. First, it is thought to be the scheme with the 
lowest rate of take-up or benefit. But second, it is clearly 
the softest means test (there is no capital income test), and 
once qualified, there is no problem about earning more money 
in the next 12 months; on these grounds one would expect the 
reaction to the FIS means test to be much milder than towards 
the more intensive means test for Unemployment Assistance. 
Our results indicate that between 13 and 22 per cent of 
persons entitled to a payment actually receive it; most of 
the remainder did not even know of the schemes existence. 
While the rate of take-up might be expected to be lowest for 
small entitlements, this is not a major factor: between 18 
and 30 per cent of those entitled to a payment of over t:5 per 
week do not receive the payment. These figures compare 
unfavourably with the take-up rates of around 50 per cent in 
the UK, which themselves have given rise to concern about the 
effectiveness of the scheme's outreach. More radical 
measures, such as automatic payment of FIS through the wage 
packet <i.e., a partial integration of the tax and transfer 
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systems in implementation> may be necessary to improve 
outreach. 
5.5 Conclusions 
A significant proportion of persons falls below the 
safety-net income; probably somewhat more than in the UK. 
<Also somewhat higher than in Continental European countries 
involved in the EC research project I. The UK measures are 
based on similar survey data to that used here. It seems 
likely that the UK measures include groups similar to those 
identified here <such as the self-employed, farmers would be 
a less important category> which are not eligible for 
Supplementary Welfare Allowance. The greater proportion of 
farmers in Ireland may partly explain the higher proportion 
of persons falling below the official minimum income 
standard. But the relative performances of the social 
security systems in providing an effective safety net, which 
reaches those in need, would also seem to play a role. 
6. Measures of Poverty Reduction Effectiveness and Efficiency 
at Alternative Poverty Lines 
6.1 Concepts of Poverty Reduction Effectiveness and Poverty 
Reduction Efficiency 
We now move on to a broader evaluation of the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the social welfare system in reducing 
poverty at some of the independently derived poverty lines 
detailed earlier. In this analysis, we use the concepts ond 
measures deve:oped by Reclrnrman (1979al, and widely ased 
since then (e.g., by Dilnot, Kay and Morris, 1984 in ll1eir 
review of the performance of the British system>. 
The Beckerman measures of poverty reductio11 effectiveness and 
efficiency are based on two building blocks; the first is the 
concept of pre-transfer income, and the second is the poverty 
gap. 
Pre-transfer income is defined simply as actual net income 
less actual social security transfers received. There are 
two main d1·awbacks to this. First, it ignores the fact net 
pre-transfer income would also be affected by consequent 
reductions in tax liability. Second, it ignores 
behavioural responses to the existence of social sec11rity 
transfers and the taxes needed to finance them. The 
drawbacks of this are obvious, but the difficulties involved 
in estimating a counterfactual based on the absence of all 
social security are equally apparent. Given these 
difficulties, a11d the limited relevance of the zero social 
security counterfactual, it seems preferable to invest our 
efforts into estimating counterfactuals for more realistic 
policy changes, allowing for the effects of the income tax 
system, and for possible behavioural responses. In the 
interim, however, the Beckerman concepts can be used to 
provide a preliminary picture of the system's performance. 
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Given the concept of pre-transfer income, households or 
families can be classified into three types. Type l, has 
income below the poverty line even after transfers; type 2 
has a pre-transfer income below the poverty line, but a 
post-transfer income above the line; and type 3 has a 
pre-transfer income above the line. 
The poverty gap for a family in poverty is the difference 
between its income and the poverty line. The aggregate 
poverty gap is simply the sum of these gaps for all 
households below the poverty line. It provides a measure of 
poverty which has certain advantages over the more familiar 
head count (the proportion of families or persons in 
poverty>, in that it takes account of how far below the 
poverty line families are falling; an increase in the incomes 
of poor families which still left them below the line would 
be reflected in this measure as a reduction in poverty, while 
the head count measure would say poverty was constant. It is 
also particularly suitable for the analysis of the social 
security system, because it provides a measure of poverty in 
money terms, which can be related to social welfare spending. 
The Beckerman measure of effectiveness is the percentage of the 
pre-transfer poverty gap which is eliminated after social 
security transfers are added: i.e. the ratio between total 
payments of type A1 and A2 on Figure 6.1, and the total 
pre-transfer poverty gap <which is equal to the sum of 
post-transfer poverty gaps, D, plus the total of payments of 
type A1 and A2 >. An alternative way of illustrating the 
concept is shown in Figure 6.2 where again it is represented 
by ( A1 + A2 > / ( A1 + A2 + D > • 
The Beckerman measure of efficiency is the percentage of total 
social security spending which goes towards the elimination of 
the poverty gap: in Figure 6.1, this is the ratio of the total 
of payments of types A1 and A2 to the total of all payments, 
including Band C. Again this can be illustrated in Figure 6.2 
as (A1+A2 l/lA1+A2+B+C). Implicitly this measure of efficiency 
takes the elimination of poverty at the particular poverty line 
chosen as the only goal of the social welfare system: it is in 
this sense that the amounts spent on raising incomes above that 
level are "wasted", either as "spillover" payments to those 
initially below the poverty line (payments of type BI or 
payments to those initially above the poverty line (payments of 
type Cl. 
One can interpret these measures in several ways. Taken at 
their simplest, they are based on a view th~t poverty is not a 
matter of degree: at a certain income level, a person is in 
poverty, while at a slightly higher level he or she is not 
poor. Even if one accepted this view, one must allow that 
there is uncertainty and disagreement about where to draw the 
line: this alone would suggest that the analysis should be done 
for a range of levels of the poverty line. Our preliminary 
analysJs of the standard of living indicators for households at 
different income levels also seems to suggest that poverty is 
not such a cut-and-dried phenomenon: there may well be degrees 
of poverty. This again supports examination of the efficiency 
and effectiveness measures at different poverty lines. 
15 
Figure 6.1 Classification of Households for Analysis 
of the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Transfers 
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Note: Adapted from Dilnot, Kay and Morris, 1984 
Figure 6 2 Poverty Reduction Effectiveness and 
Poverty Reduction Efficiency 
Income 
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Line 
/ 
A1 /, 
/ 
Pre-Transfer 
Income - - ·-
Post-Transfer 
Income 
-~~~~~~-Households ranked 
by income, 
poorest on left 
Note: Stylized representation of the income distribution and 
income transfer system, adapted from Beckerman and Clark, 1982. 
Poverty Reduction Effectiveness= <A1+A2I/IA1•A2+DI 
Poverty Reduction Efficiency 
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6.2 Application of the Measures of Poverty Reduction 
Effectiveness and E[ficiency to the Irish Data 
The basic results on the ''effectiveness'' and ''poverty 
reduction efficiency'' of the social welfare system are given 
in Table 6.1 below. The analysis presentsd here is based 011 
what is often called a tax unit i.e., a single person or 
married couple together with dependent children. The only 
difference from the benefit unit is that children aged 18 or 
over who are in full-time education are now counted as 
members of the parental tax unit (so a dependent child is one 
which would would have counted for purposes of the child tax 
allowance before its abolition in the 1986 Budget>. We have 
also conducted similar analyses at household level, and will 
refer to these results later. 
This table is based on the equivalence scale of l for the 
head of the tax unit, 0.66 for other adults, and 0.33 for 
children, implied by the payment structures of social welfare 
schemes. The use of other values could give rise to findings 
of inefficiency and ineffectiveness which would be wholly due 
to differences in equivalence scales. The results were, 
however, very similar when the equivalence scale was changed 
to l for the head of tax unit, 0.7 for other adults and 0.5 
for children. 
Table 6.1: Poverty Reduction Effectiveness and Poverty 
Reduction Efficiency at Different Income 
Standards 
Equivalence Scale: 1, 0.66, 0.33 
% of Mean Equivalent Income 
% of Tax Units Delow Standard 
Poverty Reduction Effectiveness 
(% of pre-transfer pove1·ty 
gap eliminated> 
Poverty Reduction Efficiency 
(% of social security which goes 
towards reducing poverty gap> 
40% 
12 
79 
54 
50% 
22 
76 
67 
60% 
31 
70 
77 
We will discuss the level of the results In the context of some 
international comparisons. First, however, we concentrate on 
interpreting the strong pattern which emerges: a rise in 
poverty reduction efficiency, coupled with a fall in poverty 
reduction effectiveness as the level of the poverty line rises. 
Efficiency rises from 54% to around 77%, while effectiveness 
falls from 79% to 70%. The fall in effectiveness reflects the 
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fact that several important schemes provided rates of payment 
at or just above the lowest of these poverty lines; as the 
poverty line is raised, these schemes are necessarily less and 
less effective. The rise in efficiency also reflects the 
differentiated payment structure of the Irish social welfare 
system: payment rates vary not only between contributory and 
non-contributory schemes, but also between the elderly, widows 
and the unemployed, for example. 1 If one considers tax units 
which depend on a single social welfare payment for their 
income, it is clear that a poverty line set at the system's 
lowest rate of payment is likely to find a high poverty 
reduction effectiveness but rather low poverty reduction 
efficiency, while a poverty line set at the highest rate of 
payment must find more efficiency but less effectiveness.2 
The results presented in Table 6.1 strongly 
general tendency. This can be demonstrated using 
classification of the sources of inefficiency. 
reflect this 
the following 
l. Social 
have 
line. 
welfare payments going to 
pre-transfer income above 
This is labelled 
persons who 
the poverty 
"vertically 
inefflci~ncy'' by Beckerman, 1979a. 
2. Social welfare payments which are themselves 
above the poverty line will involve an 
inefficiency even if the recipients have zero 
pre-transfer income. We will refer to that 
part of the inefficiency which arises solely 
from the excess of social welfare payments 
over the poverty line as the "excess payment'' 
effect. 
3, We will refer to the remaining sources of 
inefficiency as ''pure spillover''. Tl1is 
includes cases where the recipient has other 
income below the poverty line, and a social 
welfare payment less than the poverty line, 
but the two together exceed the poverty line; 
it also includes the full amount of 
pre-transfer income for cases where the social 
security payment itself ls above the poverty 
line. 
Beckerman uses the term ''spillover" to refer to the total of 
items 2 and 3; but the distinction between what we have 
termed the ''excess payment effect" and "pure spillover" is an 
important one. For those tax units which have social 
security payments in excess of the poverty line, we have 
calculated this excess, as an estimate of the excess payment 
effect. The inefficiency which results from failing to 
adjust the payment for the existence of other income, so that 
it is just sufficient to bring the family up to the poverty 
level is the "pure spillover'' effect. 
Most of the inefficiency in poverty reduction at 
poverty line is due to the fact that recipients 
schemes would be brought abo,ve that level, even if 
other income i.e., the ''excess payment" effect. As 
the lowest 
under many 
they had no 
the poverty 
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line rises, the total of inefficient expenditure falls quite 
strongly, and the relative importance of other sources rises. 
But since the higl1est social welfare payment 1•ates (Widows· 
and Old Age Contributory Pensions) are significantly above the 
highest poverty line, a significant part of the inefficiency 
remaining at this level is still due to persons with no other 
incomes being brought above the level of the poverty line. 
Vertical inefficiency is lhe most important source of 
inefficiency in poverty reduction only at the highest poverty 
line, at which 23 per cent of expenditure is ''inefficient''; 
while the "pure spillover" effect is of minor importance at 
each poverty line. 
The basic analysis does not allow for differential poverty 
lines for different groups (except on the basis of the number 
of adults and children in the tax unit or household!. The 
social welfare system incorporates differences in payment 
levels which depend on several factors. Some of these are 
designed to approximate differences in the needs of different 
classes of recipient e.g., whether persons are likely to be 
dependent on it on a long-term basis, such as the elderly, or 
just for a short period, such as some of the unemployed. 
Viewed simply from a poverty reduction perspective, such 
differentiation according to need could be justified, and 
would not necessarily represent an inefficiency as the simple 
measures presented here imply. Improvements to existing 
methods of tailoring payments to meet such differences in 
needs may be possible, either in terms of re-jigging existing 
payment differences, or taking a different approach to the 
identification of relative needs; but the difficulties of 
tailoring payments to needs are widely recognised. 
The differentiation of payments on lines which are not 
designed to relate to need, but to the ''insurance principle'' 
or ''replacement function'' adverted to earlier, are more 
severely at variance with the poverty reduction objective. 
This is part of a trade-off between the poverty reduction 
objective and the income replacement one, for a given level 
of tl1e social welfare budget. The higher level of payments 
under Contributory (Social Insurance) schemes, and the lower 
level of payments under Non-Contributory 1Social Assistance) 
schemes represents an inefficiency f1·om a poverty reduction 
point of view, if the poverty line is set below the highest 
rate of payment. For a poverty line at or above the higher 
rate of payment, the differentiation is not inefficient; but 
it may be regarded as inequitable. If needs vary with a 
claimant's past PRSI record, it is more likely that those 
with irregular employn1ent patterns have greater rather than 
smaller needs. 
In interpreting the figures presented, one must bear several 
things in mind. First, the scale to which these perce11tages 
apply: a high effectiveness figure does not mean that the 
remaining problem is small, if, as is the case, the 
pre-transfer poverty gap is very large. Similarly, even the 
highest efficiency figure implies a very large aggregate 
amount ipent on raising household incomes above the highest 
poverty line. Second, there is a tendency to underestimate 
the poverty reduction efficiency of the tax and transfer 
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system as a whole because the analysis does not take into 
account any income tax paid on long-term social welfare 
benefits. Third, the pattern of results is similar in the 
household based analysis. The level of effectiveness is 
somewhat higher, and of efficiency somewhat lower. The 
reasons for this difference are clear: social welfare schemes 
are aimed at supporting the incomes of tax units rather than 
households, which means that the tax unit level of analysis 
is more appropriate for evaluating the system's performance 
in terms of its own objectives. The limited international 
evidence now available on patterns of income sharing within 
households indicates that most income sharing is within tax 
units rather than between them, which would also argue for a 
tax unit level of analysis in terms of independent criteria; 
evidence for Ireland will be collected in the follow-up to 
the ESRI Survey. Most importantly, one must take into 
account the other objectives the social welfare system is 
being asked to achieve, such as income redistribution above 
the poverty line, and the income replacement function. 
Judgements on the relative importance of these objectives 
have to be made. 
We now turn our attention to the level of the poverty 
reduction effectiveness and efficiency figures, rather than 
the overall pattern. The efficiency and effectiveness 
figures at the lowest of the relative poverty lines are very 
close to those which were found for an additional analysis 
based on the Supplementary Welfare Allowance level of income. 
This analysis can be compared with recer1t estimates in the UK 
al the Supplementary Be11efit level. Dilnot, Kay and Morris 
<1981) found that 54 per cent of UK social security payments 
went towards reducing poverty at the SR income level; the 
system was over 90 per cent effective in meeting this safety 
net target. The Irish system seems on this basis to be less 
effective than the UK system in providing a safety net, but 
equally efficient in this role. Beckerman 11979bl 
estimated the efficier1cy and effectiveness of the safety nets 
provided by the Australian, Belgian and UK systems in the 
]973/1974 period. The Irisl1 figures are closest to the 
Australian ones, which showed less effectivo11ess but more 
efficiency than the UK; Belgium showed the hiBhest 
effectiveness, but the lowest efficie11cy. 
Comparisons of effectiveness and efficiency of the safety 
nets provided by different countries are fraught with 
difficulty, because of the heterogeneous nature of these 
schemes. An alternative would be to compare the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the systems in reducing 
poverty at comparable national standards derived 
independently of the respective social security systems. 
Preliminary analysis Cat household level) in the EC Poverty 
Research Programme, of which the ESRI study forms a part, has 
been undertaken. It indicates that, compared with the 
Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Lorraine region of France, the 
Irish social welfare system is rather less effective in 
reducing poverty, but the most efficient in the poverty 
reduction it does achieve. 
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7. Incentive effects as indirect costs of poverty reduction 
The existence of social security payments, and the taxes 
needed to finance them, have an impact bn the structure of 
economic incentives. In particular, the combined affects of 
social security payments, income taxation, and non-cRsh 
benefits on lhe incentive lo work have been widely studied in 
the UK, the US and elsewhere. How should such effects be 
taken into account in evaluating the performance of the 
system? 
One framework for taking these incentive effects into account 
is to regard them as additional costs of poverty reduction. 
Much attention has been given to what is often called the 
"unemployment trap'': a situation in which a person's net 
income is increased if he or she becomes unemployed. <This 
is sometimes called the poverty trap, but that can lead to 
confusion with other concepts, so we eschew that term here). 
In terms of the ''replacement ratio'', that. is the ratio of net 
income out of work !determined by a package which may include 
not only unemployment benefit, but also lower rent for local 
authority tenants under the differential rent scheme, medical 
card benefits, and possible tax refunds) to-net income may 
exceed 100 per cent. Even if the ratio is somewhat lower, 
it is argued, this may cause some persons to choose to enter 
unemployment, or to stay unemployed for somewhat longer. We 
might look on the costs imposed by the behavioural response 
to replacement ratios as one additional cost of poverty 
reduction under the present system. 
How important is this cost? This obviously depends on the 
actual distribution of replacement ratios, and on the 
strength of the behavioural response to them. Evidence on 
the first of these factors will soon be available from the 
ESRI survey. UK evidence has suggested that the hypothetical 
calculations often used do not represent adequately the great 
variation between different groups in the population. Nolan 
(19871 has shown that this may also be the case for Ireland, 
contrary to the widespread view based on O'Mahony (19831. 
The implications for incentives of the evidence already 
presented on non-take-up of Family Income Supplement should 
also be noted. Prior to the introduction of FIS, employees 
with large families had been found to face the highest 
replacement ratios <Buckley, 19851. FIS was intended lo 
reduce the replacement ratio not by cutting benefits, but by 
raising the net income of employees with large families. But 
the performance Of FIS in reaching its target population <at 
least in terms of information, and arguably also in terms of 
payments) must be improved if the intended improvement in 
incentives is to be achieved. CBlaclrnell, 1988 has recently 
documented the other side of this coin: employees on FIS, 
may, if also affected by differential rents and other 
factors, face very high effective tax rates because of the 
progressive withdrawal of FIS. This could be described as a 
"tax trap": it pays to work rather than be unemployed, but 
after a point, increases in gross wages give no increase, or 
even a fall, in total net income. The low take-up of FIS 
limits the number of people ~ctually facing this position.I 
21 
Evidence on the responsiveness of behaviour to the incentives 
summarised by replacement ratios will also be derived from 
the ESRI Survey, bul will require rather more time for 
analysis. The UK evidence on this topit is summarised by 
Atkinson and Micklewright (1985> as '"mixed', but with 
agreement among the cross-section studies that there is no 
firm evidence of a quantitatively large disincentive effect'', 
concurring with Chiplin's 11982> comment that ''the general 
conclusion from cross-section evidence is that unemployment 
benefit has a significant, but quantitatively small effect on 
unemployment duration''. More recently, increasing attention 
has been given to the incentive effects on the wives of 
unemployed men. Time-series studies have also produced mixed 
results, some of which would suggest rather larger effects 
< including Hughes and Walsh, 1983>. Narendranathan, Nickell 
and Stern (1985) note the problems faced by time series 
analysis in disentangling the effect of benefits from a range 
of highly correlated regressors; this suggests that the 
inclusion of more recent evidence, when replacement ratios 
have fallen, will provide interesting results. Narendranathan 
et al. 's 11985> longitudinal (panel-based> study, found a 
smaller, but still significant, effect on unemployment 
duration than Nickell's 11979> earlier cross-section 
estimate. Hypothetical replacement ratios for Ireland are 
now quite high relative to other countries. Even if the UK 
tendency for hypothetical ratios to exceed Lhe actual ones is 
found to hold for Ireland, the actual Irish rates may still 
be comparatively high. If so, the overall response may also 
be more important for Ireland than elsewhere. Narendranathan 
et al. have found, l1owever, that the effect of unemployment 
benefit on duration of unemploy:nent is related to the level 
of benefits, and the level of prospective earnings, rather 
than the replacement ratio la point also taken into 
consideration by Hughes and Walsh, 1983>. Thus the question 
of the influence of unemployment benefits on ~nemploymsnt in 
Ireland is best regarded as an open one, pending further 
research along the lines pursued in the international 
literature on this topic. 
There is, however, another set of additional costs, which is 
more indirect, but may be more important: the costs arising 
from the financing of the social security system, both 
through PRSI and general taxation, including income tax. 
<See, for example, Honohan and Irvine, 1987). These financing 
measures have a broader impact on the labour market, which 
tend to reduce labour supply, and increase the cost of labour 
to employers, leading to lower employment and output: poverty 
would be increased by this mechanism through involuntary 
unemployment, and income/welfare losses would also occur at 
higher levels of the income distribution. 
Setting up a theoretical framework which e11compasses all of 
these factors is relatively simple. The state of the world 
under the status quo is summarised by listing the 
income/welfare enjoyed by each family; the state of the world 
under an alternative policy, incorporating the changes in 
individu~l behaviour and labour market consequences can be 
sununarised in a similar way. The two alternatives can then 
be ranked, on the basis of some weighted average of these 
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individual welfares. 
Present practice is very far from this theoretica-1 benchmark. 
Instead, a policy change is evaluate~ by examining its 
effe~ts on supposedly typical households, with limited 
evidence on the implications for incentives. Atkinson et al. 
119841 have shown the dangers of this approach in the UK. We 
propose to move towards the benchmark just described in a 
number of steps, some of which have already been taken in 
other countries. The first step, is to simulate the cash or 
first-round. effects of policy changes for our nationally 
representative sample, and document the actual effects on 
incentives <marginal tax rates and replacement ratios, for 
example). This would represent a major step forward from 
what is currently possible. The second step is to estimate 
the responses of labour supply to the policy changes. The 
third step is to estimate the effects of the policy changes 
taking these behavioural responses into account. 
International experience has shown that the latter two steps 
involve considerable difficulties; attempts to incorporate 
estimated responses in the analysis of tax/transfer policy 
changes have been particularly scarce. The achievement of 
each of these ste-ps will represent a major advance from the 
previous position, towards the theoretical benchmark 
procedure. 
B. Policy Implications: Evaluation of Current Issues in the 
Light of the Analysis 
Thero is no shortage of suggestions as to how the poverty 
reduction performance of the social welfare systAm could be 
improved. There has been, however, a shortage of evidence 
and analysis relevant to the assessment of the different 
proposals. We offer some initial evidence and analysis in 
·this context. 
8. 1 Is more targeting needed? 
One set of issues relates quite closely to the efficiency of 
the social welfare system in reducing poverty. There are 
conflicting views on whether a greater degree of targeting is 
needod, and if so, or; how it should be achieved. Our 
evidence on the overall poverty reduction efficiency of the 
system is obviously relevant to the first question. The 
proportion of social welfare payments which goes towards 
poverty reduction was. found to be around 55 per cent at the 
safety net level of income. Dilnot, Kay and Morris 119841 
comment on a similar level of efficiency in the UK as 
follows: ''If our principal objective is to boost low incomes 
to an acceptable level, this could be done more cheaply, 
and/or we could afford to be considerably more generous to 
the poor if payments to those who do not strictly 'need' the 
money were curtailed" Ip. 551. This comment highlights the 
scope for reallocating an existing social security budget. 
But our a11alysis has also shown how small a role such 
reallocation can play at higher levels of the poverty line; 
at the 60% line, 77 per cent of social welfare expenditure 
goes towards poverty reduction. On the basis of these higher 
23 
lines, the need for greater targeting is much less. 
Reallocation of the existing social welfare -budget is 
sometimes opposed on the grounds that, ih the real political 
context in which such decisions are made, it represents a 
strict alternative to an increase in the social security 
budget; to admit that there may be a role for reallocation 
may, in effect, rule out any increase in the overall social 
welfare budget. This may well be true, but in order to find 
the best possible policy, it must be possible to consider 
changes in both the size of the budget, and changes in the 
allocation of a given budget. In the next section, 
therefore, we consider some issues relating to the allocation 
of the existing budget. 
8.2 Which method of targeting - contingency or means test? 
Suppose then, that we take the existing size of the social 
welfare budget as a given. What would be the best strategy 
for targeting assistance to those most in need? The 
Co~nission on Social Welfare argued that ''Contingency based 
payments are an effective means of directing social security 
payments to persons in need of an income without actually 
undertaking means tests'' because ''The large majority of 
recipients of the present contingency based schemes do not 
have other incomes end their social welfare payment replaces 
an income loss arising, for example, from unemployment, 
illness or retirement" <p. 181>. 
We can test this argument by comparing the distribution of 
payments under means-tested and contr·ibutory schemes over tax 
units arranged in order 01· their pre-transfer income. The 
results (see Table B.l below) show that non-means-tested 
schemes are quite selective, even relative to means-tested 
payments. 54 pet' cent of contributory payments go to tax 
units with no other income, as against 66 per cent of 
means-tested payments. At the other end of the scale, H per 
cent of contributory benefits go to tax units in the top four 
deciles, as against 1 per cent of means tested benefits. 
Similar analysis at household level, and on the major 
contributory and means-tested sche1nes revealed a similar 
pattern; nor were these results sensitive to a change in the 
equivalence scale. 
This analysis does not take into account the fact that 
non-means-tasted benefits will tend to raise recipients 
higher up the income scale than the corresponding 
means-Lasted payments: this can be seen from Table 8.2, which 
shows the distribution of payments over tax units arranged in 
order of post-tran2-_fer:. income. However, the figures in Table 
8.1 show that the differential in the payment structure is 
the most important cause of this phenomenon, rather than the 
failure Lo adjust the contributory benefits for incomes from 
other sources by means-testing. <This reinforces the point 
made earlier ubout the t'elative importance of the "excess 
payment effect'' and ''pure spillover'') 
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Table B.i: Distribution of Main Types of Social Welfare 
Expenditure over Tax Units Classified by 
Deciles of Pre-TrarnJfer Income per Adult Equivalent 
Total Means- Conti· ibutory Child 
Social tested Benefits Benefit 
Welfare Benefi.ts % 
Benefits % % 
o .. 
'O 
54.75 66 54 19 
3.57 4 4 3 
20.28 20 23 8 
8.62 7 8 17 
4.79 2 4 16 
2.90 1 2 14 
2. 11 0 2 9 
1. 49 0 1 8 • 
1. 49 0 1 6 
100.00 100 100 100 
TIIDSE l/1 TU 
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Table 8. 2. Dist1'ibution of Main Types of Soc:: ia 1 Welfare 
E:xpenditm·e over Tax Unj..ts Classified by 
Deciles of Disposable Income per Adult Equivalent 
DECIL!: Total Mean:1- Contributory Child 
Social tested Benefi. ts Benefit 
Welfare Benefits % 
Be1iefi ts % % 
% 
Sot'[:JM 10 % 2.93 4 1 7 
2 M,I 21.13 41 10 1 '7 
3 ra 18. 10 19 19 10 
4 (l, 15.04 13 18 7 
5 (~ 16.57 12 2-0 10 
6 th 11. 81 6 15 14 
'7 t4 5.09 2 6 11 
8(1, 4.41 2 5 9 
9 (~ 2.59 0 3 8 
.- 10;,; lo( 2.33 0 3 7 
100.00 100 100 100 
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This evidence broadly supports the Commission on Social 
Welfare's contention. The contingency ba~is for payments has 
been criticised on grounds other than lack of selectivity: 
for example, it has been criticised, as ·noted in Section 7, 
on the general grounds of increasing the incentive to fall 
into the contingent state (sickness, unemployment I. But the 
evidence presented here suggests that simply means-testing 
the contingency based payments would do little to alter these 
incentives either. 
8.3 How well targeted are Child Benefit Payments? 
Some evidence on this topic is also shown in Table 8.2. The 
answer to this question is sensitive to the equivalence scale 
used. At the equivalence scale approximating the present 
structure of payments <including the present level of child 
benefit), child benefit is not very selective: the poorest 30 
per cent of tax units receive 34 per cent of the payments 
under the scheme. But those who believe that the existing 
payment structure underestimates the costs of children <as 
might be suggested by the more generous child additions in 
the UK> will argue that the equivalence scale 1, 0.7, 0.5 is 
more appropriate. Under this scale, the proportion received 
by the poorest 30 per cont or tax units increases to 46 per 
cent. Even on this scale, however, over a third of 
expenditure goes to the top 50 per cent or tax units. 
8.4 Targeting by taxation 
Targeting is widely associated with means-testing; but we 
have seen that contingency based payments are an alternative 
method of targeting, and taxation can also be used for 
targeting purposes. It already is, to the extent that 
long-term social welfare payments are subject to income tax. 
Both the Commission on Taxation and the Commission on Social 
Welfnre recommended the taxation of short-term social welfare 
benefits; the Commission on Taxation favoured a non-taxable 
child benefit, while the Commission on Social Welfare 
Ip. 2961 reports that it did not reach agreement on this 
issue. Proposals to tax various elements of short-term 
social welfare <such as child benefit, or disability benefit) 
have also been made from time to lime. 
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Targeting through the tax system is not subject to the 
non-take-up objection to means-testing. The exact extent of 
administrative difficulties does, however, have to be 
established and taKen into account. Rec'ent work by Dilnot, 
Stark and Webb <1987) has illustrated that the scope for 
targeting by making benefits taxable is limited, and that the 
effects on incentives need to be taken into account. We will 
consider these issues in more detail in a Foundation for 
Fiscal Studies seminar in December, using a model of the 
Irish tax and benefit system to explore the implications of, 
for example, making child benefit taxable, and using the 
revenue to raise the level of payment. 
8.5 Rationalization of the payment structure 
The Commission on Social Welfare has suggested a move towards 
a single basic payment level <with a 10% differential in 
favour of contributory payments), starting by raising the 
lowest levels of payment to around C45. Others would suggest 
that the ins11rance/assistance differential be abolished, with 
either a ''splitting the difference'' or ''levelling up'' 
approach. <This proposal need not of itself be associated 
with a move towards generalized means-testing: qualification 
for the single level of payment could be on the basis of 
either income or contingency plus contribution record). 
In terms of the analysis presented earlier, such changes 
would be likely to increase both effectiveness and efficiency 
at a poverty line equal to the uniform payment. This does 
not mean that there would be no losers: if the uniform 
paymdnt was between the initial differentiated payments, in 
order to keep the change revenue neutral, those initially on 
the higher payment would lose. If, instead, the payments 
were ''levelled up'' to the higher level, the losers would be 
those affected directly or indirectly by the additional 
taxation needed to finance the increased expenditure. 
A number of points relevant to such proposals emerge from the 
preceding analysis. Let us make two very large assumptions, 
in order to establish what the social welfare system could 
achieve if its existing budget were wholly devoted to 
reducing poverty. First, let us assume that other objectives 
of the social welfare system can be neglected; second, let us 
assume that the system can be made 100% effective and 
efficient. The analysis of the Survey figures then indicates 
that the level of payment which could be financed would be 
between 50% and 60% of mean income per equivalent adult i.e., 
around C45 i.e., everyone below that level of income could be 
brought up to that income, if payments were concentrated 
entirely on this group, and account was taken of their 
pre-transfer income. <This is not, therefore, an estimate of 
what could be financed under a basic income scheme, which 
fulfils neither of these ·conditions). Given that our 
results have also shown the existing safety net had 
considerable problems, that other objectives are politically 
importan\, and that this hypothetical scheme would involve 
effective marginal benefit withdrawal rates of 100% below the 
poverty line, we can safely say that this provides an upper 
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bound to what the existing budget could achieve. 
The other main point relevant to these proposals has already 
been discussed: from a poverty reductibn point of view, 
differences in payment must be justified by differences in 
needs. Differences in payment which do not relate to 
differences in needs can only be justified in terms of a 
trade-off between poverty reduction and other objectives. 
9. Conclusions 
The analysis presented here has outlined a broad picture of 
poverty in Ireland today, and of the role played by the 
social welfare system in reducing poverty. This helped to 
highlight certain areas of concern, and to throw new light on 
certain policy issues. A more detailed evaluation of policy 
proposals will soon be possible, by simulating the cash and 
incentive effects of policy changes for the ESRI's nationally 
representative sample. 
Notes 
1. The term differentiated payments is reserved to refer to 
differences based on these characteristics; it does not refer 
to the practice of making additions for adult dependants and 
dependent children. 
2. If lhe system was 100% effective and efficient at some 
poverty line, then analysis of alternative poverty lines above 
and below this target poverty line would show a different 
pattern: effectiveness would be JOO% up to the target poverty 
line, and decline thereafter, while efficiency would rise while 
effectiveness is constant, and lhen slay constant at 100% while 
efficiency was falling. Instead of this we observe rising 
efficiency while effectiveness is fal.ling. 
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